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 The End of Financial Repression?
A Cross-Country Analysis of Investment￿




We estimate a model of investment under ￿nancial restrains due to Demetriades
and Devereux (2000), using total and private aggregate investment data from 38 high
income and low income countries during 1972-2002. Our main ￿ndings for the overall
sample are that (i) the US real interest rate is a robust determinant of total investment,
suggesting that US monetary policy may have unintended global consequences; (ii) a
term proxying domestic ￿nancial restraints is found to have an insigni￿cant impact
both on total and private investment. These ￿ndings are, however, somewhat less con-
clusive when we examine low income countries on their own, where ￿nancial restraints
are found to have a negative and marginally signi￿cant e⁄ect on total investment.
Keywords: ￿nancial restraints, investment, dynamic panel data
JEL Classi￿cation: O16, G18, G28
￿We gratefully acknowledge ￿nancial support from the ESRC under the World Economy and Finance
Research Programme (grant RES-156-25-0009).
yCorresponding author: Panicos Demetriades. Address: Department of Economics, University of Leices-
ter, University Road, Leicester, LE1 7RH, UK. Tel.: +44 116 252 2835. Fax: +44 116 252 2902. Email:
pd28@le.ac.uk.
11 Introduction
In the early 1970s, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) put forward the idea that ￿nancial
repression ￿i.e. government imposed controls on lending and deposit rates, capital controls,
and directed credit - had a negative impact on investment and growth in developing countries
by suppressing domestic saving and distorting the allocation of credit. While their views
were vigorously challenged by a range of critics1, their main policy recommendation, namely
￿nancial liberalisation gained momentum among policy makers in developing countries. As a
result, the last forty years have witnessed a gradual removal of ￿nancial restraints worldwide
with increased movement of capital around the globe.2 Both these developments are likely
to in￿ uence the behaviour of investment. Increased international capital ￿ ows combined
with a decline in subsidised, albeit rationed, loans may result in a relaxation of borrowing
constraints faced by ￿rms that did not have access to cheap loans. At the same time, the
price of credit for ￿rms that enjoyed access to cheap domestic loans may rise, making their
investment plans more sensitive to market interest rates and less sensitive to the quantity
of -previously rationed- credit. In a world in which borrowing constraints matter less for all
￿rms, the price of credit will matter more. In such a world, we would, therefore, expect to
see that at the aggregate level ￿nancial restraints play little role in determining investment
while the market price of credit plays a much greater role. This paper provides evidence
which suggests that both these developments are already in place. Moreover, it also provides
evidence which suggests that the relevant market price of credit is the one prevailing on world
capital markets. Speci￿cally, it shows that the US interest rate has a negative and signi￿cant
e⁄ect on investment in 38 countries worldwide while domestic interest rates prevailing in
those countries are generally not signi￿cant. This result, which implies that US monetary
policy may have unintended global consequences, is robust to a variety of checks, including
the inclusion of the US growth rate which should ￿lter out the e⁄ects of US aggregate
demand on other countries.
We utilise a theoretical model of investment which assumes that ￿rms have access to
1See for example, Arestis and Demetriades (1999 ), Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz
(2000), Singh (1997), Stiglitz (1994), Taylor (1983), Van Wijnbergen (1983).
2Abiad and Mody (2005) document the gradual reduction of ￿nancial restraints around the world while
Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2005) document the increase in ￿nancial openness.
2quantity-constrained domestic loans that are cheaper than those they can obtain from in-
ternational capital markets.3 This recognises the stylised fact that increased international
capital ￿ ows have relaxed borrowing constraints for many ￿rms while at the same time some
￿rms may have continued to bene￿t from access to cheaper policy loans. Firms may borrow
on the domestic market at a lower interest rate than the one prevailing on the world capital
market but are quantity-constrained in that market because the domestic banking system
is unable to satisfy the total demand for credit. Firms, however, may have access to ￿nance
on the world capital market, albeit at a higher lending rate.
We estimate the investment model using recently developed panel procedures that take
into account the time-series properties of the data, namely panel cointegration and mean-
group estimation methods. These techniques, which allow for parameter heterogeneity across
countries, enable us to examine the long-run determinants of aggregate investment in 38
countries during the period 1972-2002. These procedures are more powerful than individual
country cointegration tests and also allow generalised conclusions to be drawn for broad
groups of countries. Moreover, they overcome the inconsistency problem present in conven-
tional panel estimation that does not take into account the time series properties of the data
and heterogeneous dynamics across countries (see Pesaran et al.,1995).4
The paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the model of investment
under ￿nancial restraints. Section 3 outines the three versions of the empirical model that
we estimate and presents the econometric methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the
data and main empirical ￿ndings, including robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 summarises
and concludes.
2 Investment under Financial Restraints
The dynamic investment equations estimated in this paper are based on the theoretical
model put forward by Demetriades and Devereux (2000), henceforth D&D. Their approach
3The model is based on Demetriades and Devereux (2000).
4This problem is even more serious in dynamic panel data, when it is shown that the pooled estimators
remain inconsistent even if both the time and cross-section dimensions are allowed to increase within bounds.
In sharp contrast, the mean group estimator that we utilise provides quite precise estimates of the long-run
e⁄ects in the presence of heterogeneity even for quite small panels (e.g. N = T = 20).
3is preferable over empirical studies of investment which take an ￿ eclectic￿view of investment,
a euphemism for including variables suggested by alternative theories without a single un-
derlying structural model. In contrast, D&D use a microeconomic model of a representative
￿rm￿ s investment decision under ￿nancial restraints as their starting point. The model sug-
gests a structural relationship between the optimal capital stock and the ￿ modi￿ed￿cost
of capital, which is then used to derive a long-run theory consistent aggregate investment
equation that takes into account the presence of ￿nancial restraints. The rest of this section
provides a brief outline of the D&D approach.
The main assumption of D&D is that the o¢ cial banking system is unable to satisfy
the entire demand for investible funds because of the presence of an interest rate ceiling,
which restricts the supply of funds ￿ la McKinnon-Shaw (see also Fry, 1994). The model
departs from the McKinnon￿ Shaw tradition, however, in that it assumes the existence of
an ￿ alternative￿￿nancial market in which ￿rms can borrow freely, albeit at an interest rate
that is higher than the o¢ cial lending rate. Their interpretation of the alternative market
is that it is the world capital market although it could also be interpreted as the uno¢ cial
credit market also known as ￿ curb￿market (see Taylor, 1983 and Van Wijnebergen, 1983).
There are theoretical and empirical reasons for us also preferring the ￿rst interpretation to
the second, not least the stylised facts relating to the increased international capital ￿ ows
alluded to in the introduction. Thus, we assume that ￿rms have access to two types of
borrowing: domestic bank borrowing and international loans. Rationing of domestic loans
to di⁄erent ￿rms is assumed to depend on the availability of collateral, which is related to
the ￿rm￿ s capital stock.
The representative ￿rm j is assumed to maximise the wealth of its shareholders, given
by the present discounted value of dividends (Djt). The nominal discount rate used in
determining the present value is the one which one obtains in the world capital market,
denoted i￿
t, since this is the rate at which shareholders are assumed to be able to borrow or
lend as much as they wish.5 Note that the ￿rm takes both the domestic lending rate i and
the world interest rate i￿ as determined exogenously in the appropriate market. Moreover,
5The model assumes that there are two groups of investors in the country: sophisticated investors, who
can lend and borrow in the world capital market and who own shares, and unsophisticated investors, who
save only in the o¢ cial banking sector.
4the ￿rm is assumed to be able to raise ￿nance only through borrowing or retained earnings.
Formally, the optimimisation problem can be stated as:











l￿1)￿1; subject to the following constraints:
Djt = qtYj(Kjt￿1) ￿ ptIjt + Bjt ￿ (1 + it)Bjt￿1 + Ajt ￿ (1 + i
￿
t)Ajt￿1; (2)
Kjt = (1 ￿ ￿)Kjt￿1 + Ijt; (3)
Bjt ￿ xjtptKjt; (4)
where Et is the expectations operator, qtYj(Kjt￿1) represents current revenue, where qt is
the price of output in period t and Y is output, which in turn is a function of the capital
stock at the beginning of the period, Kjt￿1,6 Bjt ￿ Bjt￿1 and Ajt ￿ Ajt￿1 are new issues of
one period debt from the domestic and international market, respectively, ptIjt represents
the value of current investment, where pt is the current price of capital goods and Ijt is
the quantity of investment made during period t, itBjt￿1 and i￿
tAjt￿1 are nominal interest
payments to the o¢ cial and alternative market, respectively,7 and ￿ is the exponential rate
of depreciation of capital assumed constant.
The ￿rst two constraints are standard in models of ￿rm investment. The ￿rst constraint
is the ￿ ow of funds identity for the ￿rm and the second constraint is the equation of motion
of the capital stock. The third constraint is speci￿c to D&D: it constrains the supply of
domestic bank loans from the o¢ cial market to be a proportion, xjt, of the value of the
￿rm￿ s capital stock. The capital stock, therefore, represents collateral￿ banks are willing to
6Stocks dated t refer to the end of period t, equivalent to the beginning of period t + 1.
7In both markets, the model assumes that the nominal interest rate is set at the time the borrowing
takes place. Thus, for example, the interest rate applying to o¢ cial borrowing at the beginning of period
t (the end of period t ￿ 1, denoted Bjt￿1) is determined at the beginning of the period and hence denoted
it￿1.
5lend more to large ￿rms than to small ￿rms.8
Rearranging the ￿rst-order conditions yelds
Et[qt+1YKjt(Kjt)] = i
￿






This states that, in equilibrium, the expected marginal revenue product of capital is equal
to a modi￿ed cost of capital. The modi￿ed cost of capital is a function of two interest
rates: the interest rate on domestic bank loans and the interest rate prevailing in the world
capital market. The greater the availability of domestic bank loans, the greater the weight
attached to the former. For a given stock of bank lending available at a reduced rate, the
cost of capital is lower and the demand for capital by each ￿rm is higher relative to the case
in which such cheaper ￿nance was not available￿ as would be the case if, in the absence
of restraints, the domestic market o⁄ered ￿nance at the rate available in the world capital
market.
Equation (5) holds for every ￿rm in the economy. D&D show that the same argument
can be applied to the economy as a whole providing that certain aggregation conditions are
satis￿ed and that ￿rm-speci￿c shocks to the proportion of a ￿rm￿ s capital stock ￿nanced
out of bank loans cancel out across ￿rms. If so, the existence of ￿nance at a lower rate than
r￿
t, which is available in proportion to the size of the capital stock, means that the aggregate
long run equilibrium capital stock will be higher than in the absence of such funds.9
In the long-run we expect equation (5) to hold. In the short-run, D&D assume that
investment will be driven by the di⁄erence between these two variables, although adjustment
of the actual capital level stock to the desired level would be gradual because of time lags in
decision making, ordering, delivery and installation of new capital. This gradual adjustment
is ￿ exibly modelled by introducing lags in the main variables as follows:
Ijt
Kjt￿1























8Note that ￿rms cannot borrow from the o¢ cial market to lend on the alternative market.
9See Figures 1 and 2 in D&D.
6In this speci￿cation Y=K can be interpreted as a proxy for the marginal product of
capital. The modi￿ed cost of capital is split into two components, the real interest rate in
the world capital market and the term capturing ￿nancial restraints.
Since we expect investment to depend on the di⁄erence between the marginal product and
the modi￿ed cost of capital, the theoretical model predicts that bj2 should be positive and
bj3 negative. A positive bj4 would provide support to the hypothesis that the existence of an
alternative market for credit outweighs the credit rationing e⁄ect described by McKinnon￿
Shaw. In such a case increasing the level of the interest rate ceiling in the domestic market
would serve to increase the overall cost of capital which corresponds to Figure 1 in D&D. On
the other hand, a negative bj4 would suggest that the existence of the alternative market is
not su¢ cient to outweigh the McKinnon-Shaw e⁄ect i.e. on balance higher domestic interest
will have a positive e⁄ect on investment. This case corresponds to Figure 2 in D&D, where
the supply of domestic ￿nancial savings is elastic with respect to the domestic interest rate,
so that an increase in the domestic interest rate has a relatively large e⁄ect on the domestic
supply of investable funds.
3 Econometric Issues
There are three variables in Equation (6) that are not directly observed in the dataset: the
capital stock, the world capital market interest rate and the ￿nancial restraints dummy.
The construction of the ￿rst is based on the perpetual inventory method, given by expres-
sion (3).10 The interest rate i￿ used here is the US lending rate, which is a reasonable
approximation to the cost of loans from the world market. Using a foreign interest rate for
i￿ necessitates, however, adapting the expression for the cost of capital in Equations (6.1-
6.3) since in the theoretical model, both i￿ and i are nominal interest rates denominated
in domestic currency. However, each rate is e⁄ectively de￿ ated by the domestic expected
in￿ ation rate so that the relevant interest rates to use in empirical work are the real ex
ante interest rates, both denominated in domestic currency. This would require knowledge
10The initial capital stock for each country was constructed by using K0 = ((
1974 P
t=1970
It)=5)=￿, where ￿ is
the depreciation rate, assumed to be 4%. The resulting capital-output ratios were within plausible limits.
7of expected in￿ ation rates in the US and the domestic economy and also expected rates of
depreciation/appreciation of the US dollar vis-￿-vis the domestic currency. Given these dif-
￿culties, we assume that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds so that expected movements
in the exchange rate will be given by di⁄erences in expected in￿ ation rates. The latter are
measured by the current in￿ ation rate prevailing in each country. The ￿nancial restraints
dummy is based on the expected real interest rate di⁄erential r￿ ￿ r in domestic currency,
which is obtained by ￿rst de￿ ating i￿ and i by the respective in￿ ation rates. In the theoret-
ical model, the supply of bank loans becomes rationed only if r￿ exceeds r. This suggests
that an observation could be considered as being under condition of ￿ ￿nancial restraints￿if
r￿ ￿ r > 0 and this is the central case which we consider.11
We estimate three versions of Equation (6), exploiting the panel structure of the data as
discussed in more details below.
Model 1, the ￿ benchmark￿model, which corresponds to a world without ￿nancial re-
straints, is given by
Ijt
Kjt￿1








t + "jt: (7.1)
Models 2-3 test the ￿nancial restraints hypothesis by including the term that modi￿es
the cost of capital under ￿nancial restraints as follows
Ijt
Kjt￿1


































where the subscript j refers to country j and the error term is IID(0;￿2
j):
11However, it is possible that the domestic interest rate exceeds the US lending rate but that nevertheless
￿rms in that country experience credit rationing. Alternatively, a country￿ s domestic interest rate may be
lower that the US lending rate and the country may not actually face ￿nancial restraints for various reasons.
Hence, we experimented with alternative de￿nitions of ￿nancial restraints, ranging from r￿ ￿ r > ￿4 to
r￿ ￿ r > +4. In fact, the results were not sensitive to the change in the de￿nition of ￿nancial restraints,
and we therefore only report the results for the benchmark case where r￿ ￿ r > 0.
8In Equation (7.2) it is assumed that all the countries are always operating under ￿nancial
restraints whereas in Equation (7.3) the ￿nancial restraints proxy is interacted with Djt, a
dummy variable that equals 1 in the presence of ￿nancial restraints and 0 otherwise.
The analysis above is carried out separately for each country j = 1;:::;N, which provides
some statistical advantages. In particular, if we are interested in whether the economic
theory outlined in Section 2 is applicable across all countries, then the tests of unit roots,
and of cointegration can exploit the panel structure to improve the statistical power of the
tests. Furthermore, averaging the values of the long-run multipliers across countries provides
a summary of these results in the form of the mean group estimator which, although involving
loss of information through aggregation, also serves to show whether the behaviour patterns
observed are con￿rmed across a broad range of countries.
To elaborate brie￿ y, we have noted that the modelling framework described above will be
particularly relevant when the variables under discussion are I(1). In recent years, a large
literature has emerged in which panel unit root tests have been developed, typically testing
the null that all the series measured in each country have a unit root against the alternative
that a fraction do not (the ￿ heterogeneous alternative￿ ); see Breitung and Pesaran (2006)
for a review. In this literature, tests based on simple averages of the test statistics obtained
in the unit root tests applied to each of the individual country￿ s series in turn, are found
to perform well in the sense that they are relatively powerful in rejecting the null when
the alternative is true. A good example is the IPS test of Im et al. (2003), based on the
cross-country average of individual Dickey-Fuller statistics, which we carry out in the paper.
In testing for cointegration, we adopt the residuals-based approach. This is appropriate if
we know that there exists at most a single cointegrating relationship among the variables and
this feeds back to a speci￿ed endogenous variable. Pedroni (2004) and Kao (1999) suggest
tests that are comparable to the IPS test but based on the residuals from a contemporaneous
regression of the levels value of the (known) endogenous variable on the levels value of the
exogenous I(1) variables. Pesaran and Smith (1995) describes the single-equation framework
in detail and raises the important issue of heterogeneity, recognising that, while there is rarely
any strong justi￿cation for restricting system dynamics to be common across countries,
there are occasions when the long-run relations might be common (e.g. where they relate to
9arbitrage or solvency conditions or common technologies). Estimates of the long-run e⁄ects
can be obtained for each country. The mean group estimator obtained by averaging these
statistics across countries will provide a measure of the long-run e⁄ects that is more reliable
than that based on any single country and the variance of this mean group estimator can
be calculated using the non-parametric procedure described in Pesaran et al. (1996).
It is worth emphasising that the issue of heterogeneity in the errors across cross-sectional
units is key to obtaining valid estimates of the long-run coe¢ cients. Pesaran and Smith
(1995) show that in the static case, if the coe¢ cients di⁄er randomly, pooling, aggregating,
averaging group estimates, and cross-section regressions all give unbiased estimates of co-
e¢ cient means. However, in the dynamic case, pooling and aggregating give inconsistent
and potentially highly misleading estimates of the coe¢ cients, though the cross-section can
provide consistent estimates of the long-run e⁄ects.
4 Empirical Findings
Our panel dataset contains 38 countries over the period 1970-2002. A detailed description of
the countries involved, measurement of variables and data sources is given in the Appendix.
The ￿rst two observations are kept for transformations and lags. The estimation periods
are 1972-2002 for total investment and 1972-2000 for private investment.
Table 1 reports the results of the panel unit root test of Im et al. (2003), which is based
on the average of augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t statistics for individual countries. For
both total and private investment, the panel unit root statistics support the null hypothesis
of non-stationarity for all the variables.
Table 2 shows estimates of Pedroni (2004)￿ s panel ADF (unweighted and weighted) and
Group ADF statistics, as well as estimates of Kao (1999)￿ s ADF statistics. Both Pedroni and
Kao panel cointegration tests have the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Pedroni describes
two alternative hypotheses: the homogenous alternative, which Pedroni terms the within-
dimension test or panel statistics test (weighted and unweighted), and the heterogenous
alternative, also refered to as the between-dimension or group panel statistics test. The
Kao test follows the same basic approach as the Pedroni tests, but speci￿es cross-section
10speci￿c intercepts and homogenous coe¢ cients on the ￿rst-stage regressors. The Maddala
and Wu (1999) test combines tests from individual cross-sections to obtain a test statistic
for the full panel. The table reports the rank obtained according to the combined Fisher
and Johansen￿ s maximum eigenvalue test statistics. The results support the presence of a
unique cointegrating relationship among the variables in the investment equation across all
three speci￿cations.
Our next step is to examine the long-run determinants of investment in the countries
included in the panel. Tables 3 and 4 report mean-group estimates of long-run e⁄ects using
total investment and private investment respectively for each of the three models described
above. In each table, Panel A reports estimates for all countries, while Panel B and Panel
C report estimates for high income and low income countries respectively.
For total investment (Table 3), the results for the overall sample and high income coun-
tries on their own show that the coe¢ cient of the US real lending rate is negative and
signi￿cant at the 5% level across all three speci￿cations whereas the term proxying ￿nancial
restraints is insigni￿cant, regardless of whether it is interacted with the dummy variable.
For low income countries on their own, however, the ￿nancial restraints proxy interacted
with the dummy variable is negative and signi￿cant at the 10% level, suggesting that for
these countries ￿nancial restraints continue to be relevant. The negative coe¢ cient suggest
that the McKinnon-Shaw e⁄ect -higher domestic interest rates leading to a higher supply of
investable funds- dominates the world capital market e⁄ect, indicating that the supply of
loan by the domestic banking system is relatively elastic (as in Figure 2 in D&D).
For private investment (Table 4), the results for the overall sample show that the coe¢ -
cient on the US real lending rate is negative and signi￿cant at the 5% level in Model 1 and
Model 3, and it is negative and signi￿cant at the 10% level in Model 2. For high income
and low income countries on their own, it is negative and signi￿cant at the 10% level in
Model 1 and Model 3. Furthermore, for high income countries on their own it is negative
and signi￿cant at the 10% level for Model 2 and for low income countries on their own it
is insigni￿cant. Importantly, for private investment, the term proxying ￿nancial restraints
is always found to be insigni￿cant, regardless of whether it is interacted with the dummy
variable and regardless of how the countries are categorised.
11Finally, we check whether the results obtained with Model 1 are robust. More speci￿-
cally, we examine whether the coe¢ cient on the US real interest rate remains negative and
signi￿cant following the inclusion of an interest rate di⁄erential term and a term capturing
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is the growth rate of US real GDP per capita.
Table 5 reports the results of these checks.12 For total investment, the ￿nding that the
US real lending rate is an important determinant of investment appears to be robust to the
inclusion of both the interest rate di⁄erential term and the term capturing the impact of US
aggregate demand on domestic investment both for the overall sample and for high income
countries on their own, across the two speci￿cations. For low income countries on their own,
the estimate on the US lending rate remains negative but its statistical signicance drops to
10%. In contrast, the estimates on the two added terms are always insigni￿cant, regardless
of how the countries are categorised, which suggests that neither the domestic interest rate
nor US aggregate demand are the driving factors behind total investment.
For private investment, the coe¢ cient on the US lending rate is negative but only signif-
icant at the 10% level for the overall sample, and negative and insigni￿cant for high income
and low income countries on their own. It must be noted, however, that the estimates
on the two added terms are again always insigni￿cant, regardless of how the countries are
categorised.
12The robustness analysis was also carried out using US real GDP per capita in levels. The results
obtained were similar.
125 Conclusion
The last thirty, or so, years have witnessed a gradual elimination of ￿nancial restraints
worldwide, starting with OECD countries, most of which became fully liberalised by the
early 1990s. These trends were followed by developing countries around the globe, led by
East Asian and Latin American countries (Abiad and Mody, 2005). Financial liberalisations
have included the removal of lending rate ceilings - which in the McKinnon-Shaw paradigm
were seen as a major deterrent on investment ￿and the gradual elimination of restrictions
on international ￿nancial transactions. Against this background, it is perhaps not very
surprising to ￿nd that aggregate investment in 38 countries is already more responsive to
US interest rates than to domestic interest rates. Surprising or not, these ￿ndings not only
indicate the end of the era of ￿nancial repression but may also have profound implications
for policy makers worldwide. Speci￿cally, our ￿ndings suggest that policy makers in both
developed and developing economies may have less in￿ uence over the cost of capital in their
own country than the Federal Reserve. The ￿ ip side of the same coin is that US monetary
policy may have unintended global consequences. Speci￿cally, it may impact directly on the
cost of capital in other countries, over and above any indirect e⁄ects through US aggregate
demand.
Besides their policy implications, our ￿ndings have suggestions for the direction of future
research in relation to macro-econometric modelling. Speci￿cally, they imply that studies
of investment can no longer a⁄ord to ignore global factors such as the world interest rate.13
We are, of course, not the ￿rst authors to point out the importance of global factors in
macro-econometric modelling.14 This paper￿ s ￿ndings certainly add more weight to the
view that global economic inter-dependencies need to be explicitly taken into account in
macro-econometric models, highlighting further the dawn of a new era in macro-econometric
modelling.
13Recent studies of investment in developing countries continue to be mainly concerned about the impact
of domestic interest rate policy on investment, neglecting the possible in￿ uence of world capital market
conditions e.g. Agrawal (2004).
14See, for example, Pesaran and Smith (2006), who provide a pioneering new perspective using a global
VAR model in which the global variable is the foreign in￿ ation rate.
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16Appendix A: Description and Sources of Data
I is total or private ￿xed capital formation; K is total or private capital stock; Y is real GDP;
(Y=N)￿ is US real GDP per capita; r￿ is US real lending rate; r is domestic real lending rate;
B is claims on private sector by deposit money banks and other ￿nancial institutions. The
data is from the World Bank Development Indicators (2005). Data on private investment is
from Everhart S.S and M.A. Sumlinski (2001). ￿ Trends in Private Investment in Developing
Countries, Statistics for 1970-2000 and the Impact on Private Investment of Corruption
and the Quality of Public Investment.￿ Discussion Paper No. 44, International Finance
Corporation.
Appendix B: List of Countries
The lower income group comprises countries with real GDP per capita of less than US$3,500
in 1970. The countries are Algeriaa;b, Boliviab, Burkina Fasoa, Cameroona, Chile, Costa
Rica, Cote d￿ Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ecuadora;b, El Salvador, Gabona, Ghanaa,
Guatemala, Haitia, Hondurasa, India, Kenya, Koreaa;b, Malawi, Morocco, Paraguay, Perua;b,
Philippines, Rwandaa;b, Sri Lankaa, and Thailand.
The higher income group of countries comprises Argentina, Canadaa, Denmarka, Japana,
Mexico, Norwaya, Switzerlanda, Trinidad and Tobago, USAa, Uruguayb, and Venezuela.
Notes: a denotes data on private investment is not available. b denotes data on domestic
lending rate is not available. USA is excluded from the regressions including an interest rate
di⁄erential term since the latter would be equal to zero by construction.
17Table 1: IPS (2003) panel unit root test




























t ) ￿3:5969y ￿1:4630




























t ) ￿22:8738y ￿25:1400y
Notes: TOT means that the variable was constructed using total investment data. PVT means
that the variable was constructed using private investment data. The (standardised) tIPS has
an asymptotic N(0,1) distribution under the unit root null hypothesis. ydenotes rejection at
the 5% level. The r￿
t series was tested using the standard unit root tests and found to be I(1).
18Table 2: Panel cointegration tests
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
TOT PVT TOT PVT TOT PVT
N=38 N=20 N=30 N=20 N=30 N=20
Pedroni (2004)
-Panel ADF
Within-u -1.54yy -2.45y -0.38 -2.45y 0.27 -1.61yy
Within-w -2.62y -3.41y -3.46y -3.27y -2.12y -2.40y
-Group ADF
Between -3.00y -3.43y -2.49y -2.76y -1.69y -2.43y
Kao (1999)
-ADF -4.15y -1.59yy -3.79y -1.60yy -3.79y -1.60yy
Maddala-Wu (1999)
-Rank (r) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: TOT means that the model includes variables constructed using total invetsment data.
PVT means that the model includes variables constructed using private investment data. All
the statistics have an asymptotic N(0,1) distribution under the null hypothesis. The tests are
one-sided. The number of lags was selected automatically using the SIC and the maximum
number of lags was automatically chosen based on the number of available observations. The
results of both Pedroni and Kao tests were obtained assuming no deterministic trend. y and
yy denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 10% level respectively. The results
of the Maddala-Wu test (combined Fisher and Johansen￿ s maximum eigenvalue test statistics)
were obtained under Eviews Model 3 with one lag in ￿rst-di⁄erences.
19Table 3: Estimation results, using total investment
Mean-groupe estimates
(t-ratio)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

























~ b4 - -
-1.5255
(-1.26)
b1 0.4946 0.4468 0.4512

























~ b4 - -
1.2066
(1.28)
b1 0.5547 0.5230 0.3322

























~ b4 - -
-2.6965yy
(-1.66)
b1 0.4701 0.4141 0.4201
Notes: Model 1:
Ijt



















Kjt￿1 + "jt; Model 3:
Ijt












Kjt￿1 +"jt: Sample period: 1972-2002. y and
yy denote signi￿cance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
20Table 4: Estimation results, using private investment
Mean-groupe estimates
(t-ratio)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

























~ b4 - -
0.4547
(0.73)
b1 0.4435 0.4404 0.4498

























~ b4 - -
2.4117
(1.02)
b1 0.4444 0.4438 0.4399

























~ b4 - -
-0.1975
(-0.97)




































Kjt￿1 + "jt: Sample period: 1972-2000. y and yy denote signi￿cance
at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
21Table 5: Robustness checks
Mean-groupe estimates
(t-ratio)
Total Investment Private Investment
Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5










































b1 0.4469 0.4617 0.4421 0.4365










































b1 0.5191 0.5549 0.4420 0.4333










































b1 0.4160 0.4218 0.4422 0.4376
Notes: Model 4:
Ijt





















Sample periods: 1972-2002 (total investment) and 1972-2000 (private investment.). y and yy
denote signi￿cance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
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